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Commentary: Pennsylvanian's Should




The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was established on May 22,
1722 and is the oldest appellate court in the nation.' An 1850
constitutional amendment made the justice selection an elective
statewide process for full terms, which continues today.2 The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania has existed since 1895 and was constitutionally
mandated in 1968.3 Each full-term member of the Superior Court is also
elected on a statewide basis by the voters. The Commonwealth Court
was established at the Constitutional Convention of 1968 and the judges
began to sit on the court on January 1, 1970. 4 Since the Commonwealth
Court's existence, the full-term members have also been elected
statewide.5
Should the Pennsylvania Supreme, Superior and Commonwealth
Courts' justices and judges continue to be elected by the voters or should
a "merit selection" process be utilized which would mandate that full-
term justices and judges be nominated by the governor and confirmed by
the Senate of Pennsylvania? 6 This commentary will discuss the merits of
* Counsel for Pennsylvania State Senator Robert C. Jubelirer.
1. 115 PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL § 5-4 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 5-5.
4. Id.
5. The judiciary branch of Pennsylvania also consists of numerous other courts,
including the Courts of Common Pleas, magisterial courts, Philadelphia courts,
Pittsburgh magistrate court, as well as other judicial bodies, all of which elect its full-
term members in the corresponding jurisdictions. This commentary will not focus on
these courts.
6. See generally PA. CONST. art. V, § 13. Judicial vacancies for unexpired terms
due to resignation, sickness or death are filled by appointment of the governor and
confirmed by a two-thirds vote in the Senate, except in cases of the justices of the peace
(district justices), which are by majority.
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a selection process for Pennsylvania appellate judges. Before the merits
of a selective process are analyzed, however, this commentary will focus
on several deficiencies with the current judicial elective system.
7
1I. Three Fundamental Problems Associated with Electing
Pennsylvania Appellate Judges
A. Anonymity of Judicial Candidates
How many justices comprise the Pennsylvania Supreme Court? If
you knew the answer to be seven, then you are ready for the next
question. How many judges comprise the Pennsylvania Superior Court
and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court? If you knew the answers to
be fifteen and nine respectively, go to the head of the class. Ready for
the bonus question? Name the current nine Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court judges.
The appellate judiciary in Pennsylvania generally functions in
obscurity. This lack of notoriety is a positive aspect of our judiciary; yet,
it collides with the core concepts of the elective process. A legal scholar
summarized the issue of judicial anonymity this way: "The simple fact
of the matter is that most people in Pennsylvania do not even know that
we elect all our judges in Primary and General elections .... ,,8 Two
political analysts wrote the following about judicial candidates: "'Who
are these people anyway?' That question could be asked by almost any
voter going into the voting booth on Election Day after viewing the
names of the judicial candidates on the ballot. Hence, name recognition
and not merit become the essential electoral ingredient."9
Although it is difficult to ascertain with reasonable certainty how
much voters know about any particular statewide judicial candidate, polls
strongly suggest that most voters have little idea who is running for
statewide judgeships.' 0 In May 1997, a survey of registered voters in
Erie County suggested that only two percent of the 1966 voters
interviewed were able to name two or more of the eight judicial
7. This author is in no way critical of the quality or intellect of the men and women
who have served or are currently serving as Pennsylvania's appellate court justices or
judges. This commentary focuses solely on whether the people of Pennsylvania should
be given the opportunity to adopt a new system for the selection of justices and judges.
8. Carl S. Primavera, You Be the Judge: Appoint Them or Elect Them?, YORK
DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 2001, at A13.
9. G. Terry Madonna and Michael Young, Politically Uncorrected, YORK DAILY
REC., Jan. 21, 2001, at 3.
10. ELLEN MATrLEMAN KAPLAN, BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION REFORM, 4, at http://www.pmconline.org (Apr. 16, 2001).
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hopefuls.' 1
Proponents of the elective process argue that nothing should abridge
an individual's right to select his or her judicial candidate of choice on
Election Day. Victor M. Diaz, a civil trial attorney in Miami and the
chairman of Citizens for an Open Judiciary wrote, "whatever
imperfections may exist in the current system shculd be addressed
through careful reform, not by taking away the most basic privilege of
American citizenship--our right to vote-in favor of an unregulated and
selective process of politically appointed judges."' 2 The Shamokin News
Item Editorial Board also voiced its criticism of a merit selection system
when it opined, "Governor Ridge wants to take away one of your
important rights, the right to decide who will serve as judges."'
' 3
Should not, however, the protected privilege of voting at least hinge
in some small way on an informed electorate? J. Keath Fetter, the
former president of the Chester County Bar Association, addressed this
question when he stated, "I think it's very, very difficult for the voters to
know much of anything about the people [judicial candidates] for whom
they're voting. Even as a lawyer, I have trouble."' 14  Pennsylvania
appellate judges obviously serve the Commonwealth in means wholly
different than those of legislators. In fact, Governor Ridge stated,
"judges are not representatives. Their job is to interpret the law and the
Constitution.'' 5  Merit selection is considered, and in many states
embraced, because the roles in which judges serve are so dramatically
different than the roles of those who serve as members of the executive
or legislative branches. 16
As noted above, this commentary focuses on merit selection for
appellate judges only. A merit selection process would not likely affect
the electorate voting on county judges or local district justices. Moving
to a merit selection system would indeed prevent the electorate from
exercising a core function of democracy: the right to vote, in this case,
for statewide judges. Such loss must be weighed against the potential
gains of a merit selection system. Before deciding whether to no longer
allow the electorate to cast votes for appellate judges, two other systemic
problems within the current elective process must be addressed.
11. Editorial, ERIE MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1997. This poll was conducted just
days prior to the Pennsylvania primary election on May 20, 1997.
12. Victor M. Diaz, Jr., Don't Take Away Public Vote: Potential for Corruption
Greater in Secretive Appointment Process, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2000, at A 16.
13. Editorial, "Merit Selection" Has No Merit, SHAMOKIN NEWS ITEM, Apr. 11,
2001, at 4.
14. David Bernard, Ridge Pushes Appointing Judges, DAILY LOCAL NEWS, Feb. 8,
2001, at A3.
15. Albert J. Neri, Ridge Pushes for Merit, ERIE TIMES, April 11,2001, at A 10.
16. This issue is further addressed in Part II(C) of this commentary.
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B. The Negative Impact of Judicial Fundraising
Although most Pennsylvanians have little idea who is running for
appellate vacancies, this does not prevent judicial candidates from raising
money, and lots of it. In January 1998, a poll was commissioned to
ascertain the sentiments of Pennsylvania residents regarding the affects
of judicial fundraising. The poll results were dramatic in that "88
percent of the respondents believed that decisions made by judges in
their courtrooms are, at least sometimes, influenced by large
contributions made to their election campaigns."1 7  Seven appellate
vacancies were filled in Pennsylvania on November 6, 2001.18
Approximately $2.7 million was raised by the individual fourteen
candidates.' 9 Over fifty percent of those funds came from lawyers
practicing in Pennsylvania.20  Philadelphia Bar Chancellor, Allen
Gordon, in response to judicial fundraising, recently stated, "We believe
that judges taking money from lawyers who may appear in front of them
creates the appearance of impropriety.' Unfortunately, the practice of
judicial candidates raising money has been occurring in Pennsylvania for
decades. According to James Eisenstein, Professor of Political Science
at Pennsylvania State University, "over an 18-year period, from 1979 to
1997, a total of slightly greater than $17 million (in 1997 dollars) was
contributed to thirty-five competitive Pennsylvania Supreme Court
candidates.
22
Pennsylvania is not the only state attracting substantial campaign
contributions for state appellate judicial races. On March 25, 2002, USA
Today reported that $45.6 million was raised for state supreme court
17. KAPLAN, supra note 10 (Poll conducted by Lake, Sosin, Snell & Associates and
Deardorff/The Media Company.)
18. There was one vacancy in the Supreme Court and three vacancies in the Superior
and Commonwealth Courts.
19. The total 2001 campaign contributions per candidate were as follows: Mike
Eakin--$280,129; Kate Ford-Elliott-$881,460; Richard Kleir--$ 146,350; Mary Jane
Bowes-$196,963; John Bender-20,444; David Wecht-$290,520; Stephanie
Domitrovich-$31,200; Lydia Kirkland-$40,300; Mary Hannah Leavitt-$ 142,450;
Renee Cohn-$108,660; Robin Simpson-S97,305; James Dodaro-$316,700; Jerry
Langan-$93,000; Irwin Aronson-$20,000. These totals include only monies raised by
the judicial candidates themselves and does not include substantial contributions from
third parties and state committee groups.
20. This information is based upon a review of all individual campaign finance
reports for 2001. The actual percentage was computed to be 53.14 percent. This
percentage may not be absolutely precise due to the fact that the Pennsylvania law does
not require contributors to note his or her profession if the contribution is less than $250.
21. Jill Porter, Why Would Judges Take $$ from Lawyers?, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,
March 25, 2002, at 6.
22. James Eisenstein, Pennsylvania Selects Judges in a Most Unjudicial Way, YORK
DAILY REC., October 15, 2000, at 3.
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races across the country in 2000.23 The report also noted that
"approximately 60 percent of the $45.6 million raised in Supreme Court
races in 2000 was raised in three states: Alabama, Illinois and
Michigan., 24  No longer are interest groups focusing campaign
contributions solely on the legislative and executive branches of
government. For example, according to the New York Times, "[t]he
measures, which often place a maximum on damage awards and
otherwise limit recoveries by people claiming injury, have spawned
challenges in many state courts, which, in turn, have spawned campaigns
by trial lawyers and business groups to shift those courts their way. 25
There are thirty-one appellate judges and justices in Pennsylvania.
It follows that it may, for some interest groups, be more economical to
attempt to influence a branch of government consisting of thirty-one
members rather than the General Assembly in Pennsylvania, which has
253 participants. Judicial candidates are forced to raise hundreds of
thousands, and, in some cases, millions of dollars. More than a majority
of the money in Pennsylvania is coming from the same lawyers who will
appear before the campaigning judges. And although the electorate does
not know who is being elected to the judicial branch, voters seem certain
of one thing: the money raised by the judges is affecting the judges'
ability when making judicial decisions.
C. Judicial Canon 7
On June 27, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided
Republican Party v. White.26 This decision will have a dramatic and
direct impact on future judicial elections in Pennsylvania. The Court
held in Republican Party that Canon 5 of Minnesota's Canon of Judicial
Conduct,27 which prohibits judicial candidates from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues, violates the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.28 The Eighth Circuit of Appeals held
in Republican Party that the restriction on free speech was narrowly
tailored and served a compelling state interest in maintaining the
interdependence and impartiality of the Minnesota judiciary. 29 The
23. Richard Willing, High Court To Weigh Limits on Judicial Races, USA TODAY,
March 25, 2002, at A4.
24. Id.
25. William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at A22.
26. Republican Party v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
27. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002).
28. Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
29. Republican Party v. White, 247 F.3d 867, 868, 872 (2001), rev'd, 122 S. Ct.
2528 (2002).
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Court disagreed, and, in a 5-4 decision, held that the restriction on
judicial speech was not narrowly tailored and that impartiality should not
necessarily be considered a compelling state interest.
30
Pennsylvania, along with seven other states, 3' has a similar judicial
speech prohibition to that of Minnesota. Pennsylvania Judicial Canon 7,
in part, states:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge for a judicial office, that
is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on
the basis of a merit system election... should not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on
disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity,
qualifications, present position, or other fact.
32
Canon 7 has been strictly interpreted in Pennsylvania. In fact, one
political commentator has stated that judicial candidates cannot give
much more than "name, rank, and serial number." 33 The Court's holding
in Republican Party has invalidated all or parts of the judicial speech
restrictions in eight states, including Pennsylvania. It is important to
note, however, that Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Republican
Party, went to some length to state clearly that it was not the majority's
intention to prohibit all types of restrictions for judicial candidates.
Scalia wrote that the constitutionality of "pledges or promises" were not
at issue in the decision.34 Chief Justice Tom Phillips of the Texas
Supreme Court stated after the release of the Republican Party decision:
As with many court rulings, it is not absolutely clear how far the
ruling goes ... we're not clear if it affects the pledges or promises
clause which covers at least the more egregious problems of a
candidate promising to rule a certain way before considering the facts
and the law.
35
Certainly, any language concerning a state's announce clause violates the
majority's decision in Republican Party; however, the language
concerning pledges or promises may still be enforceable.
There had been considerable public discussion in Pennsylvania prior
30. Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
31. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri and
New Mexico.
32. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002) (emphasis added) (stating that a
judge should refrain from political activity inappropriate to his judicial office).
33. Jeff Miller, High Court To Consider Judicial Campaign Restrictions,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Mar. 26, 2002, at A12.
34. Republican Party, 122 S. Ct. at 2532.
35. Marcia Coyle, New Suits Foreseen on Judicial Elections, NAT'L L.J., July 15,
2002, at At.
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to the Court's decision in Republican Party arguing for and against
Canon 7. Retired Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge Edward Spaeth
believes that the Eighth Circuit held correctly in Republican Party and
that the Court should have affirmed the circuit court's holding. Spaeth
stated, "If the public doesn't have confidence in the impartiality of
judges, you just can't have the rule of law."
36
Others, however, had argued that it was time to loosen the
restrictions on judicial candidates speaking about issues. In an interview
printed on March 19, 2001, a lobbyist for the Pennsylvania Trial
Lawyers Association argued that one of the needed judicial reforms is to
"give judicial candidates greater freedom to discuss issues without
getting into specific cases., 37 The current president of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association, H. Reginold Belden, Jr., disagreed. He wrote the
following prior to the Court's holding in Republican Party:
Some observers would like to see the "gag" order [Canon 7] lifted so
that judicial candidates could talk about issues. But this isn't a good
idea. Our justice system would not be well served by permitting
judicial candidates to pander to the electorate with preconceived and
publicly announced positions on disputed legal issues. This practice
would necessarily hamper the successful candidates' ability as a
judge to objectively apply the unique facts of a case to legal
precedent in arriving at an impartial decision--the basic obligation of
every judge.
38
Some participants in the Pennsylvania political process have argued
that regardless of restraints placed on judicial candidates because of
Canon 7, the activity of campaigning by judicial candidates is
worthwhile. Pennsylvania Senator Lisa Boscola opposes merit selection
because of her support of the campaign process. Senator Boscola put her
opposition this way: "I believe campaigns are good [for judges] because
it gets the candidate out in the community and going to events like
spaghetti dinners. '39 But do most Pennsylvanians really care if judicial
candidates appear at spaghetti dinners? Is the campaigning experience so
vital to the judicial process? The answer is simply "no." Arguing that
36. Jeff Miller, High Court To Consider Judicial Campaign Restrictions,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Mar. 26, 2002, at A 12. Judge Spaeth filed an amicus brief
in support of the speech restriction in Republican Party v. White on behalf of
Pennsylvanian's for Modem Courts.
37. A Question and Answer with Mark Phenicie, at http://www.capitolwire.com
(Mar. 19, 2001).
38. H. Reginald Belden, Jr., Judicial Races: As State Campaigns Become Nastier,
Appointive Process Gains Credibility, PATRIOT NEws, Dec. 9, 2001, at B23.
39. Nicole Radzievich, Morganelli Opposes Plan To Choose Judges on Merit,
EXPRESS-TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at BI.
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judicial candidates need to partake in the "campaigning experience" is an
attempt to make judicial candidates too similar to legislative or executive
candidates. The roles performed by members of the judicial branch are
vastly different than the members of the other branches, and, therefore, it
should be acceptable to have judicial candidates selected in a manner
unlike the other branches. An editorial aptly summarized the different
branch responsibilities: "Legislators are supposed to represent the views
of the voters; judges are not. They must follow the law, no matter what
the voters think. It is hard to look impartial while carrying a campaign
sign.' '4
It is difficult to ascertain the full impact of Republican Party since
this commentary is being written so close in time to the Court's decision.
However, the initial reaction by many scholars and commentators to the
decision in Republican Party has been somewhat negative. Lynn A.
Marks, Executive Director for Pennsylvania for Modem Courts, wrote,
[M]ake no mistake about it, though, the Supreme Court's ruling is
deeply troubling. Permitting judicial candidates to cast about for
votes by stating their views on hot-button issues-and thereby
signaling how they would rule in cases involving those issues-will
only undermine the actual and perceived impartiality of the judiciary
and encourage sound-bite campaigning. In our political system,
impartiality is the hallmark of the judiciary. Judges are charged with
applying the law impartially without prejudging the issues presented
to them for decision.41
Georgetown University Law Center Professor Roy Schotland stated, "It
[the Court's decision in Republican Party] is definitely going to make
judicial elections worse than they are now.' 42 Debra Goldberg of the
Brennan Center for Justice added, "We will see increasing cost and
decreasing civility.
43
One political commentator, Larry Eichel, believes that, if a state is
going to have judicial elections, the candidates should have no
restrictions on speech. Eichel writes:
[T]he high court has done something quite useful with this decision.
It's told states that if they want to elect judges, the election has to be
a full-fledged affair, in which candidates are free to behave like
candidates. And if states don't like that, if they think it unseemly,
40. Editorial, Judges Can Speak Their Minds, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 5, 2002, at
17.
41. Lynn A. Marks, Ruling Tears at Judiciary's Impartiality, PATRIOT NEWS, July
14, 2002, at Fl.
42. Tony Maur, Rulings in Contentious Cases Mark End of High Court Term, AM.
LAW. MEDIA, June 26, 2002.
43. Id.
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they can always scrap the electoral process all together.
44
It is also difficult, if not impossible, to know the full effect
Republican Party will have on future judicial elections. Judicial
candidates may individually elect to follow some speech restrictions or
they may, as many fear, attempt to attract constituencies by stating
certain policy positions in an order to improve likelihood of election.
Nevertheless, the simple truth is, with the voiding of some or most of
Canon 7, campaign contributions and fundraising will have an even
greater role in judicial elections in Pennsylvania. A lawyer representing
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University warned that
"pressures to relax Canons of judicial conduct that safeguard important
distinctions between judges and other elected officials interact
dangerously with the increasing role of money on judicial campaigns.
' '45
A truly better solution is a merit-based selection process which will focus
on an individual's qualifications rather than his or her comments or
actions on the campaign trail.
III. Making the Case for Merit Selection
A. The Basic Principles of Merit Selection
[Merit selection is best described as] a way of choosing judges that
uses a nonpartisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers to ...
evaluate applicants for judgeships. The commission then submits the
names of the most qualified applicants ... to the appointing authority
(usually the Governor), who must make a final selection from the list.
For subsequent terms of office, judges are evaluated for retention
either by commission or by the voters in an uncontested election.
46
Twenty-four states 47 and the District of Columbia currently utilize a
merit selection system for state supreme court vacancies and in many
cases other state courts as well. The remaining states rely on
gubernatorial or legislative appointments, or nonpartisan or partisan
44. Larry Eichel, Court Does the Right Thing: Ungags Judicial Candidates, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 5, 2002, at A17.
45. Robert S. Greenberger, Supreme Court To Decide on Judicial Candidates'
Speech, WALL STREET J., Mar. 12, 2002, at A28.
46. Am. Judicature Soc'y, Merit Selection: The Best Way To Choose the Best
Judges, http://ajs.org/js/ms-descrip.pdt (last visited July 28, 2002).
47. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
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elections.48
State merit selection systems vary. Therefore, it is useful to set
forth some fundamental elements of merit selection in order to discuss
generally the advantages of such a system.
The following five elements are principles of most state judicial
merit selection systems:
1. A nominating commission recommends to the Governor names of
perspective appellate court appointees.
2. The nominating commission is composed of men and women,
lawyers and non-lawyers from across the state.
3. The nominating commission is appointed by the Governor and
legislative leaders.
4. The Governor submits to the General Assembly a judicial
nominee selected from the nominating commission's list to which
confirmation is generally required.
5. After an initial term, the appellate judge could seek additional
terms of judicial office by reappointment or in nonpartisan retention
elections.
49
A merit selection system for judges could not be realized in
Pennsylvania without an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 °
The constitutional amendment process requires both bodies of the
General Assembly to pass an identical proposed change in two
consecutive sessions and the proposed amendment must be approved by
a majority of the electorate. 51  This, indeed, is a very important
consideration. Merit selection could not become the law in Pennsylvania
without a majority of Pennsylvania's electorate voting to make the
change. Merit selection cannot come to fruition in Pennsylvania without
a constitutional change, and a constitutional amendment is not adopted
without legislative and voter approval. Nevertheless, there are those who
48. Gubernatorial appointment: California, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey;
legislative appointment: Virginia; Nonpartisan election: Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin; partisan election: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia.
49. See KAPLAN, supra note 10.
50. "Justices, judges, and justices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal
election next proceeding the commencement of their respective terms of office by the
electors of the Commonwealth or the respective districts in where they are to serve." PA.
CONST. art. V, § 13(a).
51. Id.
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oppose a merit selection question being placed on the ballot.
Representative Mark V. Cohen, the House Minority Caucus Chairman,
stated, "We do not favor giving the public the right to take away its own
rights., 5 2 Said another way, Representative Cohen does not even want to
allow the electorate to decide whether to adopt a merit selection system.
This seems to be contrary to the fundamental argument of those who
oppose merit selection, which is to trust the voters to elect the best
judges.
B. The Benefits of Merit Selection
The American Judicature Society (AJS), an organization devoted to
promoting the benefits of merit selection for state judiciaries, cites the
following five reasons why merit selection is superior to an elective
process:
[1.] Merit selection not only sifts out unqualified applicants, it
searches out the most qualified.
[2.] Judicial candidates are spared the potentially compromising
process of party-slating, raising money, and campaigning.
[3.] Professional qualifications are emphasized and political
credentials are de-emphasized.
[4.] Judges chosen through merit selection don't find themselves
trying cases brought by attorneys who gave them campaign
contributions.
[5.] Highly qualified applicants will be more willing to be selected
and to serve under merit selection because they will not have to
compromise themselves to get elected.
53
In addition to and in conjunction with the five reasons stated above,
a merit selection process also avoids the three concerns of an elective
system addressed earlier in this commentary. A merit selection system
does not oblige the electorate to guess at the best candidates, would not
require judicial candidates to raise money, and practically avoids the
issues now confronting Pennsylvania's judiciary in light of the
Republican Party decision. The effects of the Court's decision in
Republican Party are substantially more apparent in an elective system
52. Reggie Sheffield, State's Way of Selecting Judges, PATRIOT NEWS, Oct. 17,
2001, at BI4.
53. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 46.
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since candidates will be pressured to speak on issues when campaigning.
A merit selection process would also yield a more racially and
geographically diverse court. The following are examples. In a national
statistical analysis done by AJS, women and minorities were selected in
greater percentages under an appointive, rather than an elective system.
The 1998 analysis found that sixty-seven percent of the women jurists
and seventy-two percent of the African-American jurists serving on state
appellate courts were initially chosen by appointment.54 In Pennsylvania,
as of February 2001, twenty-six of the thirty-one appellate judges were
residing in or near Philadelphia or Pittsburgh.55 This trend, admittedly,
may be beginning to wane. The seven judges elected in November 2001
were from several different geographic regions throughout the
Commonwealth. 6 Nonetheless, a merit selection process would allow
attorneys from remote areas in the Commonwealth to be considered. A
merit selection process would also require the nominating commission to
consider all individuals, regardless of gender, race or geographical
considerations.
Merit selection has numerous advantages over an elective system.
One of the most telling facts, however, was addressed by Jona
Goldschmidt in her writing for the University of Miami Law Review.
Goldsmith wrote:
To date, not one state that has adopted a merit plan has opted to
replace it with an elective system. This fact alone, notwithstanding
the empirical studies and anecdotal evidence cited herein in support
of merit selection, is the best evidence that it is the superior method
of judicial selection.
57
C. The Prospect of Merit Selection in Pennsylvania
Those who oppose merit selection consistently criticize the system
for being potentially no less political than the elective process. John
Morganelli, District Attorney from Northampton County, and a vocal
critic of merit selection, wrote the following: "Merit selection is only
54. According to statistics published by the American Judicature Society in
September 1998. See Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 46.
55. Choosing Appellate Judges: Partisan Elections or Merit Selection? Myth vs.
Reality, at http://www.pmconline.org (last visited July 28, 2002).
56. Michael Eakin, Lancaster County; Richard Klein, Philadelphia County; Mary
Jane Bowes, Allegheny County; John Bender, Allegheny County; Mary Hannah Levitt,
Dauphin County; Robin Simpson, Northampton County; Renee Cohn, Lehigh County.
57. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1994). This author knows of no evidence in the past eight years that
suggests that any state has changed from a merit selection system to an elective system
since the article was published.
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politics at a different level--a level which excludes the public from the
process and allows the position of judge to become a reward for loyal
party service and big political contributions. Merit selection is politics
pure and simple. '58 Two Pennsylvania senators, however, recently
appeared at a merit selection forum and addressed the criticism that merit
selection is as political as elections. Senator Robert C. Jubelirer, the
president pro tempore of the Senate and current lieutenant governor of
Pennsylvania, responded, "You will never take politics out of the system
completely, but I think this [merit selection] is one of the ways to limit
it."59 Senator Mary Jo White, from Venango County, and a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, added "I don't think you're taking
politics out of the system. You're taking money out of the system, and
that's the big corruptor.
60
This commentary intentionally did not focus on the specifics of any
certain merit selection plan. There have been numerous merit selection
proposals introduced by different members of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly over the years.61 Although the issue of merit selection has not
gained momentum in the legislature in recent years, renewed interest
may be developed in light of the Court's holding in Republican Party.
Governor Tom Ridge expressed strong interest in early 2001 to be the
issue's advocate-in-chief. 62 However, this was short-lived after Ridge
was selected to be the homeland security director by President George
W. Bush on September 20, 2001. Neither the Pennsylvania Senate nor
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives has voted on the issue during
the past several years. Like most issues before the General Assembly,
merit selection obviously has supporters and detractors. As outlined in
this commentary, critics consistently argue that merit selection is just
another form of politics, that the federal judiciary has a merit selection
system that does not work effectively, that the nominating commission
proposed will be biased, or that numerous other red herrings apply.
58. John Morganelli, There Is Nothing Meritorious About Merit Selection, PATRIOT
NEWS, May 6, 2001, at B19.
59. Reggie Sheffield, State's Way of Selecting Judges Argued, PATRIOT NEWS, Oct.
17, 2001, at B14.
60. Id.
61. The following is a compilation of some of the merit selection bills introduced
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